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Large Engines and Vehicles, 1958
During the mid-1950s, the Air Force sponsored work on the feasibility of building
large, single-chamber engines, presumably for boost-glide aircraft or spaceflight. This
work provided the basis for fast response when the natioh felt the need to catch up with
the Russians in launch vehicle capability.
In 1956, the Army's missile development group, under the technical direction of
Wernher von Braun, began studies of large launch vehicles. The possibilities opened
up by Sputnik accelerated this work and gave the Army an opportunity to bid for the
leading role in launch vehicles. The Air Force, however, had the responsibility for the
largest ballistic missiles.and hence, a ready-made base for extending their capability for
spaceflight. One example of this was Centaur, the hydrogen-oxygen upper stage for the
Atlas ICBM.
During 1958, actions taken to establish a civilian space agency, and the launch
vehicle needs seen by its planners, added a third contender to the space vehicle
competition. In this chapter, we will examine these activities during 1958 and how they
resulted in the initiation of a large rocket engine and the first large launch vehicle.
Early Air Force Interest in Large Engines and Vehicles
1-he development of the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile had hardly begun to
accelerate when the Air Force research and development arm began considering larger
rocket engines for larger vehicles. In 1955, the Air Force contracted with the
Rocketdyne division of North American Aviatiorl to study the feasibility of a single-
chamber engine with a thrust of 1.3 to 1.8 meganewtons (300000---400000 lb).
Rocketdyne designated this engine the E-I and the same year announced that a single-
chamber engine of 4.5 meganewtons ( I million lb of thrust) was also feasible. _ There
were no specific requirements for these large engines, but presumably the Air Force
was looking ahead to the need to carry larger ballistic payloads and perhaps to manned
spaceflight or boost-glide hypersonic aircraft concepts such as Dynasoar.
At the November 1956 meeting of the fuels and propulsion panel of the USAF
Scientific Advisory Board (p. 189), large rocket engines were considered. The panel
recommended that the Air Force study the feasibility of very large rocket engines on
the order of 22.3 meganewtons (5 million lb of thrust). This was far larger than any that
had been considered; the minutes do not reveal the panel's reasons for such interest.
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The Air Force waited over a year before replying to this recommendation. The reply
mentioned the work begun at Rocketdyne in 1955 and indicated that future Air Force
requirements for thrusts greater than 4.5 meganewtons could probably be met more
efficiently by clustering "appropriately-sized" smaller engines. A vehicle requirement
for 22.3 meganewtons could be met in the same manner. The Air Force reply left
unclear what size engines it was interested in, but the same month Wright Field
initiated a design competition for a single-chamber engine of 4.5 meganewtons. The
proposals were evaluated and a contract awarded to Roeketdyne in June 1958. The
large engine was designated the F-I. 2
Transfer of Large Engine to NASA
When Abe Silverstein came to NACA headquarters in early 1958 to organize a space
program, one of his immediate concerns was increased launch vehicle capability.
Consequently, his proposed FY 1960 budget, completed on 19 July 1958, contained
$30 million to initiate development of a 4.5 meganewton single-chamber engine and
$15 million for clustering existing ICBM engines to achieve the same total thrust (p.
185).
By late July it became obvious that the large engine work sponsored by the Air Force
would be transferred to the new space agency. To deal with this and other launch
vehicle matters, Silverstein organized an informal propulsion committee in-early
August (p. 195). At the 14 August meeting of this committee, the Air Force disclosed
that its contract with gocketdyne on the 4.5 meganewton engine would run out of
funds in the fall and that $2 million more, to be supplied by NASA, would be needed by
1 October to continue the work for an additional five months. Since contract
negotiations took 5 to 8 weeks, a decision by NASA was urgently needed. Silverstein,
however, resisted this pressure for NASA to make an immediate commitment.
The problem of developing a large engine was further complicated by the need for
facilities to test it. This matter was considered at the 28 August meeting of Silverstein's
committee. Air Force representatives revealed that contracts would be let by the end of
the month for a test stand at Rocketdyne's test facility capable of handling 4.5
rneganewton engines. The Air For_;e already had a test stand capable of handling this
size engine at Edwards Air Force Base, but it was tied up with Atlas missile
development. Silverstein and his propulsion assistant, A. O. Tischler, were corleerned
that the Air Force plans essentially committed the large engine development to
R ocketdyne. Silverstein decided at the meeting that any development of a large engine
by NASA would be through competitive bidding. Richard Cesaro of ARPA argued
that bidding should start immediately, but again NASA officials resisted the pressure
to act at that time.
When the Silverstein committee met for the sixth time on 9 October, NASA was
formally in business and moving. Tischler, placed in charge of the large engine,
announced that requests for competitive bids would be out within two weeks. Five days
later, NASA sent invitations to bid to seven contractors and a briefing on what was
wanted was held a week later.
The invitations called for a single-chamber engine of either 4.7 or 6.7 meganewtons
(1 or 1.5 million lb thrust), but at the contractors' briefing Tischler made it clear that
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the higher thrust was wanted.* By 24 November, NASA had received proposals and
appointed a technical and a management team to evaluate them. On 9 December the
two evaluation teams reported to the Source Selection Board; and three days later, the
Board recommended to Administrator T. Keith Glennan that Rocketdyne be awarded
the development contract.l" Giennan approved and the selection was made public the
same day. In less than a month (9 January 1959), NASA signed a definitive contract
with Rocketdyne for the development of the F-1 engine with a sea-level thrust of 6.7
meganewtons. 3
The Army's Bid to Develop Large Launch Vehicles
Although the Air Force took the initiative in sponsoring studies of large rocket
engines, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency took the lead in proposing specific large
vehicles. These began with studies by Wernher yon Braun's missile development team
in 1956 and led eventually to the Saturn vehicles developed during the 1960s. By the
time the first Saturn was authorized by the Advanced Research Projects Agency in
1958 and a decision made about which propellants to use in its upper stages late in
1959, large launch vehicle concepts had undergone a number of changes. Von Braun's
team initially opposed the use of hydrogen and oxygen in the second stage of the
Saturn. To understand why and to follow the evolution of Saturn in its early phases, a
few observations about yon Braun and his team are helpful.
In 1930, when 18, Wernher von Braun was working with Germany's rocket pioneer
Hermann Oberth, and yon Braun's entire subsequent career was devoted to rockets
and spaceflight. As technical director at Peenemiinde, he was responsible for develop-
ing the V-2, the beginning of modern liquid-propellant rocketry. He headed the 120
Germans brought to the United States by the government at the end of World War II.
In 1950, the Germans became the core for an expanding organization assigned to the
development of Army guided missiles at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. By 1956, the
guided missile development division at Redstone, with von Braun as technical director,
numbered over 2000, of whom 350 were Army officers. Over 200 of these officers were
graduate engineers who strengthened the civilian staffofengineers and technicians. By
1958 the division (then called development operations) had a complement of over 2800,
about 80 percent of the ballistic missile agency?
As head of large engineering organizations both in Germany and the United States
for almost a quarter of a century, yon Braun managed by committee or group decision.
At Redstone, his division consisted of ten laboratories representing various technical
aspects of missile development, each headed by a highly competent member of his old
German team. He used these men as a council for decision making; at meetings, yon
Braun assumed the role of chairman or moderator. He knew how to listen, maneuver,
*Tischler prepared the invitation with only tlie higher thrust value but included the lower value when
Hugh Dryden, NASA's deputy administrator, pointed to prior agreements between NASA and the Air
Force. At the bidder's briefing, Tischler made it clear the higher value was preferred and in later negotiations,
Silverstein confirmed it. Interview with Tischler, 25 Jan. 1974.
tSilverstein chaired the Board with J. W. Crowley, Abe Hyatt, R. E. Cushman, and R. G. Nunn as
members; the author was a member of the technical evaluation team.
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and persuade; proposed actions were thoroughly thrashed out until mutual agreement
was reached. Thereafter, all united behind the decision to make planned actions a
SUCCesS.
The loyalty and competence of the von Braun team were outstanding. The core of
hand-picked German engineers had worked for yon Braun in developing the V-2. They
had suffered through the Allied air raids together, escaped the advancing Russians in
the closing days of the war, and migrated to a new land and new life in 1945. At Fort
Bliss, Texas, they were enemy aliens who, though well treated, could not go into El
Paso without a military policeman as escort. _ These experiences tied the group
together--loyal to each other and to yon Braun as their leader. As excellent engineers,
they were delermined to prove their worth.
A third observation is about yon Braun's ability to sell himself and his ideas. A man
with charisma, he knew how to deal with bureaucracy,* how to compromise, and how
to maneuver to achieve his objectives. He used his talents to fire the imagination and
stimulate interest in spaceflight unabashedly, to gain support for his team and his ideas.
The publicity given yon Braun seems not to have bothered his German colleagues, who
worked as much in obscurity as he did in the limelight. The team understood and
appreciated yon Braun's ability in public relations and willingly assisted him in
building up his reputation and image, because the group shared in the rewards of
increased support.
Von Braun was as conservative an engineer in actual design and construction as he
was a bold innovator in concepts. The design of the V-2, Redstone, Jupiter, and Saturn
all reflect the conservatism of von Braun and his team. They looked askance at such
lightweight structural innovations as Bossart's thin-wall, pressurized tanks for the
Atlas ICBM, which they jokingly referred to as "blimp" or "inflated competition."
They preferred husky, sturdy structures which Krafft Ehricke characterized as
"Brooklyn bridge" construction. Their structural designs were sound, if somewhat on
the heavy side. This conservative design philosophy mitigated against the use of liquid
hydrogen which, more than conventional fuels, depended upon very light structures to
help offset the handicap of low density. 6
The final observation about von Braun and his team stems from their alliances. By
fate and by choice, these engineers were aligned with the military in Germany and in the
United States; those alliances were both an advantage and a handicap. The.advantage
lay in pressing military requirements in both countries, which assured the team
virtl,aUy a blank check in developing rocket missiles. Emphasis was on achieving
success rapidly and seldom, if ever, on minimum cost. But the same reasons that gave
the team liberal support also restrained them from deviating from the immediate task
at hand. This meant little tolerance for indulging in schemes for spaceflight, yon
Braun's greatest interest. He was arrested and jailed in 1944 for alleged sabotage of the
*At a dinner honoring yon Braun at his departure from NASA in 1972, Eberhard Rees, his Iongtime
deputy and associate, spun a yarn about German bureaucracy. Peenemfinde purchase requests had to be
approved by Army headquarters, and a request for a gold-plated instrument mirror was rejected as
insufficiently justified. Rees, attempting to write a technical justification, was stopped by yon Braun. Just tell
them we want it because a solid gold one would be too expensive, he advised. Rees did and the request was
promptly approved. Imerview with D. D. Wyatt, Bethesda, MD, 31 Aug. 1975.
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A-4 missile he was developing because he was overheard speculating on spaceflight.*
At the U.S. Army's Redstone Arsenal, yon Braun was under similar restraints,
although he soon found a kindred spirit in Maj. Gen. J. B. Medaris, commander of the
Army Ballistic Missile Agency.
Von Braun wanted to adapt existing missile equipment to launch a satellite as early
as 1954. He lost out to Vanguard in a 1955 bid to launch satellites for the International
Geophysical Year, but by 1956 he had assembled equipment capable of launching a
satellite. Sputnik I gave him the long-awaited opportunity and he succeeded with
Explorer I on l February 1958.
Explorer I was the opening gun in the Army's campaign for a strong role in space.
Following the initial Russian and American satellites, it became clear that Russian
launch capability far exceeded that of the U.S. and the yon Braun team was quick to
respond to the U.S. outcry for larger launch vehicles. Among those envisioned was one
of multiple stages; the first stage, a cluster of 4 engines, would develop a total of 6.7
meganewtons (1.5 million lb of thrust). The report on this study was submitted to the
Department of Defense on l0 December 1957: "A National Integrated Missile and
Space Development Program." It was the first of several bids for a space role by von
Braun and Medaris.
The December 1957 report was updated in March 1958; it described l l launch
vehicles starting with the Navy's Vanguard and Army's Juno I, and continuing to the
very large vehicle of 6.7 meganewtons (table 6). Two of the proposed vehicles used
high-energy upper stages with hydrogen-oxygen as one of the candidate propellant
combinations. 7 One of these was the stage that Krafft Ehricke had prop_3ed in
December 1957 (p. 194).
The March 1958 report also recommended the development of 14 propulsion sys-
tems including two large engines (table 8, p. 216). One was a cluster of 4 Rocketdyne
E-1 engines of 1.8 meganewtons (400000 ib of thrust) each, using kerosene-oxygen;
the other, Rocketdyne's F-l engine of 4.5 to 6.7 meganewtons (I-1.5 million lb of
thrust), also using kerosene and oxygen.l"
The Army Ballistic Missile Agency proposed that hydrazine be considered as an
alternative to kerosene for first-stage engines. Also recommended was an array of
upper stages and engines: large-thrust engines using space-storable (non-cryogenic)
propellants, hydrazine-fluorine, and nuclear fission; and small-thrust engines using
electric or solar power. These advanced engine concepts indicated that the von Braun
team was not at all conservative when it came to planning and proposing.
* Walter Dornberger, former commanding officer of Peenemfinde, described the incident in his book, V-2
(New York: Viking, 1958), pp. 200-207, quoting Field Marshall Keitel: _The sabotage is seen in the fact that
these men have been giving all their innermost thoughts to space travel and consequently have not applied
their whole energy and ability to production of the A-4 as a weapon of war."
÷ According to H. C. Wieseneck, Rockwell International, Rocketdyne conducted a series of rocket engine
studies during 1957 and 1958 in support of the Juno vehicle studies at ABMA. Among options considered
was the use of 8 existing ICBM engines that led to Rocketdyne's H-I engine, which was used in Saturn I.
Wieseneck to M. D. Wright, NASA, 6 Feb. 1976.
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NACA Working Group on Launch Vehicles
In the first part of 1958, when von Braun and his team were proposing an integrated
national missile and space vehicle program to the Department of Defense, von Braun
was also participating in a study of space technology for the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and making similar proposals to it. He was a
member of the NACA special committee on space technology chaired by Dr. H.
Guyford Stever (p. 181). Von Braun was also chairman of a working group on launch
vehicles for the Stever committee. Abe Siiverstein and Col. Norman C. Appold were
members of the Stever committee and of von Braun's working group.*
During the course of its study, the Stever committee met periodically and heard
progress reports from the chairmen of its several working groups, including von Braun.
One such meeting was called for Monday, 17 March 1958, at NACA's Ames
aeronautical laboratory in California. "1 have put a substantial amount of work into
the preparation of such a [vehicle] program," von Braun cabled S. K. Hoffman,
Abraham Hyatt, Silverstein, and Appold, "but do not wish to present it to the
committee without your prior approval." He suggested a meeting at a motel near Ames
for Sunday the 16th. s
Assisting yon Braun on his NACA assignment, but remaining behind the scenes, was
Francis L. Williams. He had left Wright Field to join yon Braun at the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency in February 1958 and was familiar with the December and March
proposals that the agency had made to the Department of Defense for an integrated
vehicle program. Young and handsome, ambitious and smart, Frank Williams was not
content to remain faceless behind the scenes like yon Braun's German colleagues. He
wanted part of the action, specifically to accompany yon Braun to the NASA meetings.
Aware of yon Braun's work habits, he devised a strategy for the 17 March meeting that
worked. He prepared a vehicle program, wrote himself travel orders, stowed his bag
nearby, and made an appointment with yon Braun.before time to depart for California.
As expected, time ran out before von Braun had reviewed the program. Williams, of
course, was ready to accompany him on the flight to continue the discussion. In
California, Williams persuaded yon Braun to let him present the program so that von
Braun would be free to comment on it like the other members. Von Braun agreed. 9
The bold plans of the Ballistic Missile Agency delegation evoked plenty of comments
at NACA meetings, but this did not deter the proposers. On 1 April 1958, yon Braun's
group issued a document that astounded the quiet, conservative people in NACA
headquarters. Soon all hell broke loose. On the report cover was printed "Interim
Report to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Special Committee on
Space Technology: A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development
Program: by the Working Group on Vehicular Program." Inside was the same
proposal the Ballistic Missile Agency had made to the Department of Defense. A 23-
year spaceflight program was laid out with rows of launch vehicles ranging from small
*Other members of the vehicle working group: Abraham Hyatt, Navy Bureau of Aeronautics; Louis
Ridenour, Lockheed Aircraft; M. W. Hunter, Douglas Aircraft; C. C. Ross, Aerojet-General; Homer J.
Stewart, JPL; George S. Trimble, Jr., Martin; Kraflt Ehricke. Convair-Astronautics; S. K. Hoffman, Rock-
etdyne; and W. H. Woodward, NACA, secretary.
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to huge. The flight missions included satellites ranging from small unmanned scientific
ones to a 50-man permanent satellite with a mass of about 450 metric tons. There were
also flights to the moon, interplanetary probes, and expeditions to Mars and Venus.
Total cost was estimated at $30 billion. *0
The bold and imaginative plan was too much for the NACA to swallow, and
NACA's director, Hugh Dryden, moved to dissociate his organization from it. The
headquarters copy bore a red tag with the notice: "IMPORTANT--that this Interim
Report ... not be allowed outside the NACA headquarters building under any
circumstances--unless by specific approval of Dr. D_yden." A staffer attached a
comment to the report that the Ballistic Missile Agency was "apparently advertising it
rather broadly to get implication of NACA approval for yon Braun's pitch. TM
At Huntsville, Williams received calls for copies of the report and asked NACA
headquarters for permission to distribute it. Dryden replied that he had no objection,
provided that "A statement should be attached to each copy indicating that the report
has not been approved by the NACA Working Group on a Vehicular Program and,
therefore, cannot be considered to be an official recommendation of the Working
Group or of the NACA Space Technology Committee. "12
The report contained a number of sound, timely recomm.endations; among them
was "that a development program be initiated immediately for a large engine, in excess
of one million pounds thrust [4.5 MN], and the required test facilities with emphasis on
early availability of the engine for flight test and operational use." The report was
prophetic when it recommended a spaceflight program "with particular emphasis on a
manned lunar landing within the next 10 years." Another recommendation was "that
long-range vehicle responsibility be assigned to individual development teams without
delay under the direction and coordination of a central group." There was little doubt
that yon Braun had his own team in mind. He was recommending the same vehicle
program to the military and civilian sides of the government and courting both to get
the vehicle responsibility.
On 18 July 1958, a revised and toned-down version of the earlier interim report was
issued by the NACA working group on vehicles. Gone was the recommendation to
initiate development of a large engine and in its place was "A development program be
initiated immediately for a booster in the 1.5 million pound thrust [6.7 MN] class, with
emphasis on early availability. "13 In the months that followed, development of both the
large engine and the large booster was initiated--steps which the Stever committee
merely endorsed in its final report, without including details that had been submitted
by the yon Braun working group. 14
In the time between the April interim and 18 July 1958 final report of the vehicle
working group, yon Braun had correctly sensed the direction political winds were
blowing. l'he recommendation on vehicle responsibility now read "under the direction
and coordination of the-NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE AGENCY in
conjunction with the ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY. ".5 He was
still taking no chances.
The report of the NACA working group recommended 15 vehicles in five
generations of development; with some additions and revisions, these were along lines
similar to previous recommendations of ABMA as can be seen by comparing tables 6
and 7. The first three generations that NACA recommended comprised 11 vehicles and
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TABLE 6.-vA BMA "s Proposed National Integrated Missile and Space Development Program, March 1958





Ila Thor + 117L stage
Ill Juno Ill
IV Atlas + 117L








Vi Juno IV 62--64 230--450
VII Titan 60-80 450-1400
VIII Titan + Polaris 62-80 1400-2300
IX
X
Mod Titan (Ist stage recoverable;
2d & 3d sta_es N._H,-F2 or H2-O2) 65-80 2300-4500
Mod Jupiter (Ist: 4 x 1.7 MN, RP-O2 recov.;
2d: I × 1.7 MN, RP-O2 or H.E. prop.;
3d: 356-445 kN, N2H,-F2)
11000--
63-70 16000
XI Large orbital carrier of 2 recoverable stages
(lst: 2× 6 MN* N.,H,-O2, delta wing;
2d: nuclear with NH3 or H2) 69-8O 23000
Source: "A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program,"2d ed., report D-R-16, Dev Oper Dip., ABMA.
Redstone Arsenal. AL, 14 Mar. 1958.
*Correction by author of obvious misprint,
were based on current missile developments with high-energy stages added. In the
fourth generation, an alternate vehicle was added that used 9 ICBM engines in its first
stage, a configuration--favored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency--which
was a forerunner of Saturn I. In the fifth generation, vehicles requiring thrusts as high
as 27 meganewtons (6 million lb) were recommended for a recoverable first stage. The
hand of Silverstein and the 1956 recommendations of the Air Force's Scientific
Advisory Board appear to have been at work for this large thrust vehicle, a forerunner
of the 5-engine first stage of the expendable Saturn V developed during the 1960s.
The NACA working group also recommended 17 propulsion systems which were
essentially a revised and expanded version of the ABMA recommendations, as can be
seen by comparing tables 8 and 9. Among the NACA additions was an engine with a
thrust of 2.2 meganewtons (500000 lb) using hydrazine-fluorine or a "similar high-
energy propellant." This would be a follow-on to a 53-kilonewton (12000-1b-thrust)
engine using hydrazine-fluorine, being developed for the Air Force by Bell Aircraft,
and the recommended 356-445-kilonewton (80 000-100 000-1b-thrust) engine using the
same propellants. Both ABMA and the NACA working group appeared initially to
favor hydrazine-fluorine over hydrogen-oxygen, but this was to be reversed within 18
months.
The day following the issuance of this report, Silverstein, in his spaceflight role at
NACA headquarters, completed his FY 1960 budget request, which included funds for
a large engine, the clustering of ICBM engines, and high-energy propulsion systems
(p. 185). Ten days later, on 29 July 1958, President Eisenhower signed the bill
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TABLE 7.--NACA Working Group's Recommended Space Vehicles, July 1958
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Group Type Vehicle Operational Payload
Date kg
1 IA Vanguard 1958 2-10
IB Juno I 1958 8-16
IIA Juno 11 58-59 45-90
ii lIB Thor + 117L stage 58-59 90-180
ilC Juno IV 59-80 230-1130
IlIA Atlas + 117L and/or 59-63 900-1400
IIlB Titan 60-62 450-1400
IIIC Mod. Atlas + 89 kN H2-O2 and/or 1400--4100
III IlID Mod. Titan + 53 kN N2H4-F., 62--64 1400-2700
iI1E Uprated Atlas --3 × 668 kN eng. + high-
energy upper stage and/or
II1F Uprated Titan + high-energy upper stage
1st stage recoverable 63-80 2300--4500
1V
IVA Basic large carrier--(Ist: 6.7 MN,
recov.; 2d: 2.2 MN;
3d: 356 kN high energy) and/or
IVB lst: 9 ×668 kN Atlas eng.;
2d: 3X 668 kN;






VA Recov. booster (lst: 2 to 4 X 23000-
6.7 MN; 2d: I × 6.7 MN) 68-80 68000
V B Recov. booster (Ist: 2 to 4 × 45000-
6.7 MN; 2d : nuclear) 68-80 113000
Source: Working Group on Vehicular Program, "Report to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics Special Committee on
Space Technology," 18 July 1958.
creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and on the next day, he
asked Congress for $125 million for NASA operations. Silverstein's spaceflight budget
reflected confidence that NASA would develop large engines and launch vehicles for
manned flight and high-energy upper stages for unmanned vehicles.
ARPA Initiates First Large Launch Vehicle
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), established since February 1958
and having a budget, could have acted immediately on the large launch vehicles
proposed by the Ballistic Missile Agency in the December 1957 and March 1958
proposals to the Department of Defense, but did not. Instead, on 17 April 1958, ARPA
requested that the Army Ordnance Missile Command study an advanced satellite
carrier vehicle patterned after Juno III.* The new vehicle, designated Juno IV, was
*Juno i was a modified Redstone with three upper stages of solid propellant rockets. Juno II was a
modified Jupiter IRBM with the same upper stages as Juno I. in Juno Ill, the solid propellant rockets in the
upper stages were slightly larger. Juno I launched the first U.S. satellite (Explorer I) and two others
(Explorers III and IV). Juno I1 launched two space probes(Pioneers III and IV) and two satellites (Explorers
Vii and VIII). Juno III was not built.
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TABLE 8.--ABMA's Recommended Engine Developments, 1958
No. Thrust N(lb) Propellants R&D
I 1.8 MN (400000 lb) sea level RP-O_. 1956-61
2 Cluster, 4 × 1.8 MN, SL RP-O: 1958-63
3 356-445 kN (80(X)O-IO0000
lb) in vacuum of space N:H4-F: 1957--61
4 2.2 MN (500000 lb), vac. N:H,-F2 or similar
5 45-90 kN (10000-20000 Ib), space storable
vac. (non-cryogenic) 1957-61
6 134 kN (30000 lb), vac., H2-O:, 1958-60
pressurized tanks
7 4.5-6.7 MN (1-1.5 million
lb), SL RP or N:Hd-O: 1960-66
8 445 kN, vac. space storable 1960-65
9 2.2 MN, vac. space storable 1960-65
10 1.3 MN (300000 Ib). vac. nuclear fission 1957-65
11 4 N (I Ib), vac. ion* 1957-66
12 45 N (10 lb). vac. solar power 1957-64
,13 0.9-2.2 MN (200000-500000
lb). vac. arc-thermodynamic* 1958-?
14 0.9-2.2 MN, vac. magnetohydro- 1958-?
dynamic*
Source: "A National lntesrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program,"2d ¢d., report D-R-16. Dev. Oper Div.. ABMA,
Redstone Arsenal. AL, 14 Mar. 1958.
*Requires electric powersource.
based on a modified Jupiter IRBM as the first stage with the addition of upper stages.'6
ARPA earmarked $46 million for the project.
In the months following the Juno IV order, interest at ARPA shifted to alternative
vehicles. During this period David Young, Richard Canright, and Richard Cesaro
began discussing larger launch vehicles based on using a cluster of existing engines for
the first stage. Canright, on loan from Douglas Aircraft, had examined the desirability
of using multiple rocket engines in launch vehicles for redundancy and reliability,
following much the same philosophy used for large aircraft. He was, therefore, an
instant and strong advocate for a large launch vehicle using a cluster of engines. He
differed from the Ballistic Missile Agency, however, in that he wanted to use existing
engines--the tried and proven rocket engines powering the Atlas ICBM and Thor
IRBM. Each of these produced a thrust of 670 kilonewtons (150000 lb), but both were
capable of a 25 percent increase in thrust. This meant that a cluster of 8 or 9 could
produce a total thrust of 6.7 meganewtons (1.5 million lb). Cesaro, a former NACA
propulsion researcher at the Lewis laboratory, also favored large launch vehicles using
multiple engines. ,7
In addition to large vehicles, Canright also began to consider smaller launch vehicles
that could use existing missiles as first stages. In these studies, it is not surprising that he
favored the Douglas-built Thor over the Chrysler-built Jupiter. He argued that Thor
not only had the capability of the Jupiter, but cost much less. Word of his
considerations of Thor reached ABMA, home of Jupiter, where naturally there was
some unhappiness over the turn of events. ABMA was also well aware of Air Force
interest in large vehicles, evidenced by a June 1958 contract with Rocketdyne for a
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TABLE 9,--NACA Working Group's Recomrnended Engine Developments. 1958
No. Thrust N(Ib) Propellants R&D
I 1.7 MN (380000 Ib). sea level RP-O: 1956-61
2 Cluster, 4 × 1.7 MN, SL RP-O: 1956-64
3 6.67 MN (I.5 million Ib). SL RP or N:H_-O, 1960-64
4 Cluster, 2 or 4 × 6.67 MN, SL RP or N:H_-O: 1960-65
5 27 kN (6000 Ib) in vacuum of space storable
space: vernier (non-cryogenic) 1958-59
6 200 kN (45000 Ib). vac.,
pressurized tanks N: H_-N:O_ 1958-6 I
7 445 kN (100000 Ib). vac. space storable 1960-63
8 2.2 MN (500000 Ib), vac. space storable 1960-66
9 53 kN (12000 Ib), vac. N__H_-F: 1958-63t
10 89 kN (20000 Ib), vac. H:-O: 1959-60
I I 356-445 kN (80000-100000 Ib), vac. N:H_-F: 1958-63
12 2.2 MN, vac. N_,H_-F_, or
similar 1960-65
13 2.2-4.5 MN (0.5-1 million Ib) nuclear with
hydrogen 1957-66
14 4-.-4450 N ( I-I000 Ib), vac. ion* 1957-'?
15 4-4450 N, vac. arc-thermo-
dynamic* 1958-'?
16 4---4450 N, vac. magnetohydro-
dynamic* 1958-?
17 4-4450 N, vac. thermonuclear 1958-'?
Source Working Group on Vehicular Program."Report to Ihe NA("-'_Speoal Cnmmittec tin Space Jcchnol_g 3"
18 Jul_ IqS_
*Requires electric po'_,¢r source
*Under development at Bell Aircraft tor Ihe Air Force
study of large engines. There was plenty of competition building up over who would be
responsible for developing launch vehicles.
One day in mid-1958, Roy Johnson, ARPA's director, sent Canright to represent
him at a meeting in the office of Wilbur Brucker, Secretary of the Army. Involved were
Brucker, Maj. Gen. J. B. Medaris of ABMA. ARPA chief scientist Herbert York.
David Young, and others. Brucker, a blunt, outspoken Michigan attorney and
vigorous proponent for the Army, lost no time in coming to the point: A R PA had sold
out completely to the Air Force, ignoring the Army's superb missile team at Huntsville.
as well as the equally superb missile, Jupiter. Canright attempted to state the reasons
for selecting Thor over Jupiter, but Brucker interrupted and in colorful language made
it amply clear that the Army's capability should not be ignored. After the meeting,
Medaris told York and Canright that yon Braun's operations required about $90
million a year and if ARPA would pay half that amount, the Army would be satisfied.
Canright was incensed over the Army's pressure tactics, but York apparently saw little
else that could be done. Years later Canright believed, that this meeting was a major
factor in the assignment of ABMA to develop a large launch vehicle. _
The meeting with Brucker did not resolve the issue of the configuration for the large
launch vehicle. Canright went to Huntsville and told yon Braun and his associates what
ARPA wanted: 7 or 8 Rocketdyne H-I engines in a cluster for the first-stage
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propulsion system. At the time, yon Braun still favored the Juno V configuration using
a cluster of 4 larger engines, the E-I, still on the drawing board. Canright recalls
Medaris taking him into his office along with yon Braun and saying, in effect, that
trying to make 8 engines of such complexity work together was totally impractical.
Canright, however, remained firm; he cited the favorable reaction of the National
Security Council's panel and indicated that if ABMA was not willing to cluster the
engines, a contractor could be found who would. The meeting left yon Braun still
unsatisfied with the 8-engine cluster, and he continued to argue for the use of fewer and
larger engines. '9
The planning of Silverstein at NACA and the Air Force's June 1958 contract with
Rocketdyne for feasibility studies of a 4.5-meganewton engine increased the pressure
for ARPA and ABMA to resolve the stalemate over using the cluster of existing ICBM
engines for a large vehicle. According to Richard Cesaro, a crucial meeting occurred at
the Pentagon in mid-1958. Medaris and yon Braun represented ABMA, and Roy
Johnson, David Young, and Cesaro represented ARPA. With control of the purse
strings, the ARPA men laid their views on the line in forceful language and had their
way. They also made it clear that ARPA was not going to serve merely as a money
conduit, but intended to manage the work, a far cry from the blank check approach
that ABMA had enjoyed in the past. s0
Competition from another direction faced ARPA: civilian space planning led by
NACA's Silverstein. When Siiverstein organized his propulsion and vehicle
coordinating committee (p. 195) with its first meeting on 7 August 1958, the ARPA
men sprang into action. The day of the committee meeting, Young and Canright went
to Huntsville to discuss the possibility of yon Braun's starting immediately on the
cluster engine. They proposed using some Juno IV funds for this as an expediency.
Eight days after Young and Canright returned to Washington, Johnson signed ARPA
order 14-59. It directed the Army Ordnance Missile Command and ABMA to provide
a development and funding plan for a large launch vehicle and to demonstrate its
feasibility in a full-scale, captive test by the end of 1959. Initial funding was $5 million;
the same day, Johnson signed ARPA orders 15 and 16 for Juno IV development under
reduced fundingJ_
ARPA order 14-59, 15 August 1958, was the start of the first U.S. large launch
vehicle, which would later be named Saturn. With ABMA assigned to build a large
launch vehicle, Medaris and yon Braun began to escalate the funding needed. By the
end of August, ARPA agreed to triple the funding, although this was not formalized
until December. The name of the new vehicle was changed from Juno IV to Juno V,
because tile former had been widely identified with the cluster of four E-I engines.
In September, a member of yon Braun's staff made a tactical error. The team was
accustomed to thinking big, and in a briefing to visiting NASA administrator T. Keith
Glennan, a cost analysis was shown which used the firing of a hundred Juno Vs as a
mission model. It was only an arbitrary assumption for a cost analysis, but on learning
about it, Johnson of ARPA grew very concerned that the ambitious von Braun was
getting out of hand and that the whole program might be cancelled as too costly before
it was well started. The President's National Aeronautics and Space Council was
meeting on 24 September, and Johnson summoned Medaris to Washington the day
before in order to reach an understanding about the project. After a two-hour meeting,
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the two agreed upon $13.4 million for FY 1959 and $20.3 million for FY 1960 for
research and development. An additional $1.6 million to modify a Huntsville test stand
and $7 million for Atlantic Missile Range facilities brought the FY 1959 funding to $22
million--quadrupling the initial $5 million in five weeks. This was still prior to
ABMA's submission of a development and funding plan.
In October 1958, the September agreement hit a snag. On 10 October, ABMA
submitted a formal request for the $1.6 million to alter its test stand. It moved through
government channels smoothly until it reached the Bureau of the Budget. On 1
October, NASA was formally in operation and on 14 October, Glennan requested the
Department of Defense to transfer the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the space
activities of ABMA to NASA. The Bureau of the Budget was a party to this request, so
when it received the ABMA request for $1.6 million for the test stand, it withheld
approval until the Juno V project was clarified as to its scope and the responsible
agency.
The enterprising staff at ARPA took the Bureau of Budget disapproval as only a
momentary setback. An analysis was prepared showing that Juno IV was really not
needed and its funds could be diverted to support Juno V. Johnson cancelled Juno IV
and ordered a maximum recovery of those funds from ABMA. The ARPA staff was
confident that the recovered funds, some $8 million, could be switched to support the
clustered engine project, Juno V. Young and Canright hurried to Huntsville to see if
the amount was sufficient to cover the proposed work, which included upper-stage
design studies, additional component testing, and purchase of long-lead-time
equipment. Von Braun's engineers convinced them that more money was needed and
submitted two plans: one at $17 million and the other at $11 million. ARPA
considered these and decided to allocate the $8 million for design studies, component
testing, and testing another "battleship" (non-flightweight) first stage. An additional
$3.4 million was allocated for purchasing equipment with long delivery times. It was
now the end of October and the promised funding for Juno V in FY 1959 had climbed
to $33 million. In planning for the next fiscal year, ARPA requested $40 million for
Juno V work at ABMA and $14 million for guidance equipment.
Both ABMA and ARPA must have been pleased with the upward trend of funding,
but on 13 November they got a shock. During that week, the Bureau of Budget had
found that both ARPA and NASA had requested funding for a large launch vehicle in
FY 1960. Clearly the problem of who does what needed resolution. On the 13th, James
Killian, the President's science advisor, met with DoD, ARPA, and NASA officials to
discuss, among other things, deleting Juno V funds from the ARPA budget. The
question of transferring the large launch vehicle from ARPA to NASA was raised, but
Glennan was noncommittal, so the issue remained unresolved. On 19 November,
Secretary of Defense McElroy and his deputy, Donald Quarles, agreed to include $50
million in the DoD budget for the clustered engine stage, subject to further discussions
with Killian and the Bureau of the Budget. This remained intact through the budget
review and was in the FY 1960 budget submitted to Congress in January 1959.
The ARPA men were elated over the McElroy-Quarles action and two days later
amended order 14-59 to increase the funding to $13 million, as promised in September.
The same day Johnson urged Quarles to help in securing Bureau of Budget approval
for the $1.6 million for the Huntsville test stand. Also the same day, ABMA submitted
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a proposal to A R PA for increasing FY 1959 funding for the clustered engine project to
$32.9 million, in accordance with the development plan, which included one vehicle for
static firing and four more for test flights. The funding for FY 1960 was estimated at $60
million--S10 million more than McElroy and Quarles had agreed to include only two
days earlier.
Quarles tabled the $1.6 million request for the Huntsville test stand until the FY 1960
budget was clarified. This occurred on 3 December and Quarles told Johnson ti_at the
DoD budget would contain $50 million for the clustered engine stage. Soon after, the
Bureau of the Budget released the held-up funding for the test stand. Both ARPA and
ABMA had reason to rejoice on another matter resolved on 3 December. An
agreement of that date left ABMA with the Army but "immediately, directly, and
continuously responsive to NASA requirements. "22
Summary
During the mid-1950s, the Air Force contracted with the Rocketdyne Division of
North American Aviation to study rocket engines larger than those in intercontinental
ballistic missiles. This began with the E-l, about three times larger than an ICBM
engine, but Rocketdyne believed that an engine with a thrust of 4.5 meganewtons (I
million lb)--over six times larger than an ICBM engine--was feasible. In late 1956, the
Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board was even bolder and recommended studies of
engines up to 22 meganewtons (5 million lb of thrust). The Air Force, however,
believed that such a large thrust was best attained by clustering smaller engines. In mid-
1958, the Air Force contracted with Rocketdyne for design studies of the F-I engine,
with a thrust of 4.5 meganewtons. Shortly thereafter, responsibility for developing a
large engine was transferred to NASA; in October, NASA opened the competition to
other contractors and indicated a preference for 6.7 meganewtons (!.5 million Ib of
thrust). Rocketdyne won the competition and a development contract was signed early
in 1959.
It was the Army, however, which took the initiative in proposing large launch
vehicles using E-I and F-I engines, beginning with studies in the mid-1950s. In late
1957, the Army missile development team, under the technical direction of Wernher
von Braun, submitted a national integrated missile and space development program to
the Department of Defense. Included was a vehicle with a thrust of 6.7 meganewtons.
In early 1958, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics formed a vehicle
working group as part of a space technology committee. The working group was
headed by von Braun and included Abe Silverstein, soon to become the chief planner at
the new civilian space agency. The NACA group modified and extended the Army's
recommended vehicles and propulsion systems. The favored high-energy propellant
combination in both the Army and NACA plans appeared to be hydrazine-fluorine, a
choice influenced by an Air Force development contract with Bell Aircraft for a small
engine using this combination. In August 1958, the Advanced Research Projects
Agency, responsible for planning and coordinating military space missions, ordered
the Army to devise a development and funding plan for a large launch vehicle with a
first stage using a cluster of existing ICBM engines; this was later to become Saturn 1.
NASA's request for the transfer of both the large vehicle and the Army's development
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team met with strong opposition_ an agreement in December 1958 left the Army team
intact but responsive to NASA needs.
